The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

October 2015

The Practical Approach: How the Roberts Court
Has Enhanced Class Action Procedure by
Strategically Carving at the Edges
Paul G. Karlsgodt
Dustin M. Dow

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Litigation Commons
Recommended Citation
Karlsgodt, Paul G. and Dow, Dustin M. (2015) "The Practical Approach: How the Roberts Court Has Enhanced
Class Action Procedure by Strategically Carving at the Edges," Akron Law Review: Vol. 48 : Iss. 4 , Article 7.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Karlsgodt and Dow: The Practical Approach

THE PRACTICAL APPROACH: HOW THE ROBERTS
COURT HAS ENHANCED CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE BY
STRATEGICALLY CARVING AT THE EDGES
Paul G. Karlsgodt and Dustin M. Dow*

I. 	
   Introduction ....................................................................... 884	
  
II.
A Chronology of the Roberts Court and Class Actions..... 886
A.	
   2009-2010 ................................................................... 887	
  
B.	
   2010-2011 ................................................................... 888	
  
C.	
   2011-2012 ................................................................... 888	
  
D.	
   2012-2013 ................................................................... 889	
  
E.	
   2013-2014 ................................................................... 891	
  
F.	
   2014-2015 ................................................................... 892	
  
III. The Impacts of Roberts Court Decisions on Day-to-Day
Class Action Practice ......................................................... 893	
  
A.	
   Arbitration ................................................................... 894	
  
B.	
   Class Action Fairness Act ........................................... 898	
  
C.	
   Jurisdictional Decisions .............................................. 901	
  
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction .................................... 901
2. Erie Doctrine ......................................................... 902
3. Anti-Injunction Act................................................ 903
4. Mootness ................................................................ 904
D.	
   Class Certification Decisions ...................................... 906	
  
1. The Securities Cases .............................................. 907
2. Dukes: Class-Action Killer or Reflection of
Contemporary Standards?...................................... 908	
  
3. Comcast: Extension of Dukes, or Not? .................. 913
IV. Missed Opportunities ......................................................... 914
A.	
   Issue Certification ....................................................... 914	
  
B.	
   Daubert and Expert Admissibility Standards .............. 915	
  
C.	
   Settlement Standards: A Potential New ClassAction Target .............................................................. 916	
  
D.	
   Limits on Class-Action Cutbacks in the
Employment Sector ..................................................... 918	
  

883

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 7

884

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:883

V.	
   	
   Conclusion ......................................................................... 921	
  
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has it out for class litigation,
right? After all, this is the Court that issued “a death blow to class
action” in 2011.1 And three years later, the Court extinguished would-be
class consumers by giving “financial institutions and employers a license
to do wrong.”2 What is a plaintiff and his or her counsel to do, especially
when all nine Justices target the class bar as unseemly racket?3
How about take a deep breath, for one thing. Reports of the death of
the class action have been greatly exaggerated.4 The Court has not killed
the class action. Instead, since the beginning of Chief Justice Roberts’
tenure, class-action litigation has continued its unrelenting expansion.
Without question, the Court has developed a reputation for being
unfriendly to the class action procedure. You can’t reverse certification
of the largest class action ever5 without expecting some blowback.6 But
the wide view of the Court’s approach toward class actions does not
show Justice Scalia, ax-in-hand, chopping down the Rule 23 tree.
Rather, the Justices are pruning at the edges, selectively cutting back
foliage to ensure the long-term viability of the procedure.
The Court’s decisions in some areas have been more impactful over
class-action practice than others. For instance, the Court’s favorable
stance toward enforcement of class waivers in arbitration agreements
surely has affected the viability of class actions involving some business

* Paul Karlsgodt is the national chair of BakerHostetler’s Class Action Defense practice team and
litigation coordinator of the firm’s Denver office. His practice focuses on data privacy and other
consumer class actions. Dustin Dow is an employment and labor attorney who focuses his
representation on class action work, including wage and hour cases under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. He is the editor of BakerHostetler’s annual class action review.
1. Debate, A Death Blow to Class Action?, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-classaction.
2. Herman Schwartz, How Consumers Are Getting Screwed by Court-Enforced Arbitration,
NATION (July 8, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/180551/how-consumers-are-gettingscrewed-court-enforced-arbitration.
3. See generally Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (U.S. 2013).
4. Apologies to Mark Twain, whose actual death in 1910 prevented him from commenting
on the procedural beauty of the class certification motion, realized by Rule 23’s adoption in 1937.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
5. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2546 (U.S. 2011).
6. Laura Flanders, The Supreme Court’s Free Pass on Sexism For Wal-Mart, GUARDIAN
(June 21, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/21/walmartwomen-classaction (“Familiar with ‘too big to fail?’ Welcome, now, to ‘too big to sue.’”).
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practices and in some industries. But it has not doomed the procedure
altogether—particularly considering the Court unanimously affirmed
certification of an arbitrator’s decision granting class certification in
2013.7 Even the “landmark” Wal-Mart v. Dukes employment class
action in 2011 failed to drastically circumscribe class litigation.8
Although Wal-Mart unquestionably affects the level of scrutiny that
lower courts now give to the question whether to certify a case as a class
action, the decision has not necessarily diminished the frequency with
which class actions are actually pursued.
A majority of the Court is not so philosophically opposed to class
actions that the Court appears bent on abolishing the procedure
altogether. Several times within the past few years the Court has
watched opportunities go by, despite opportunities to impose more
restrictive constraints on the scope of class litigation. Defendants on the
wrong side of class certification decisions keep asking the Court for
review and reversal. With few exceptions, the Court has declined
review. These certiorari denials are more than academic. They leave
controversial class certification decisions in place on one hand and
signal that the class-action industry continues to thrive in lucrative
corners on the other hand.
This Article explores the practical impacts of the Court’s classaction jurisprudence from 30,000 feet, observing that, with some notable
exceptions, the Court has nibbled away at the rough edges of classaction procedure while passing on chances to dictate more drastic
reform. Part II is a chronological summary of notable Roberts Court
cases that have come to define its approach toward class litigation.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Court eased its way to this point, neglecting to
grant certiorari in any significant class-action cases for the first four
years after the swearing in of Chief Justice Roberts in 2005. That
changed in 2009 when the Court began to grant certiorari over a group
of cases that are widely perceived as changing the landscape of class
litigation.
In Part III, the Article examines the practical impacts of the Court’s
class-action decisions and its certiorari denials, concluding that the Court
seems to be focused on fine-tuning class-action procedure rather than
ending it. The Court’s restrained attitude is reflected by a hesitancy to
make broad pronouncements in the class action cases it decides and in its
selectivity in choosing cases to begin with. Also in Part III, the Article
7.
8.
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explores how the Court’s reluctance to issue broad landscape-changing
rulings has left breathing room for lower courts to fill in the doctrinal
gaps. The Court has undeniably dictated a large amount of change in a
few specific areas, especially in the arena of arbitration and class
waivers. But the impact of change has been just as overstated regarding
topics such as standard of review, federalism, merits consideration,
employment, and overbroad classes—all areas that remain friendly
enough to class actions that the procedure continues to thrive. Indeed,
activity among the lower courts on class-action jurisprudence has often
enabled the Court to approve of standards already in place, rather than
write new class-action rules.
In Part IV, the Article examines the areas of class-action
opportunities that the Court either has not addressed yet or simply has
overlooked. In some cases, the Court’s lack of action has enabled classaction practice to thrive, whereas in other areas, the Court’s guidance
may be needed to provide clearer guidelines, much in the way the Court
has done with respect to class waivers in arbitration agreements.
The Article concludes by pointing out that this is not a Court that
seems intent on ending class litigation or even significantly culling it.
Instead, the Court appears quite comfortable pulling, tugging, and
shaping the edges of class-action practice. Remarkably, though
aggregate litigation looks different in many ways now than it did before
the Roberts Court era, much of that change has come from the lower
courts. The Supreme Court’s influence is reflected mainly in its
endorsement of lower court trends and the tone, rather than the direct
mandates, of its opinions.
What we don’t know—what we can’t know—is how much more
this Court will act to define the way class actions operate. Despite all
that has been decided, there are many gaps that remain. True to its
reputation as a decider of narrow issues, the Court has left much of those
gaps to be filled by the work-horse lower courts that deal with class
certification issues on a daily basis.
II. A CHRONOLOGY OF THE ROBERTS COURT AND CLASS ACTIONS
John Roberts was sworn in as Chief Justice just prior to the October
2005 Supreme Court term.9 During the first four years of his tenure, the
Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in any cases having a significant
impact on class-action jurisprudence. That changed in 2009, when the
9. Roberts Sworn In as Chief Justice, FOX NEWS (Sept.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/09/30/roberts-sworn-in-as-chief-justice/.
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Supreme Court started a string of granting certiorari in several cases
raising class-action-related issues each year.
A.

2009-2010

It was four years after Roberts was sworn in as Chief Justice in
2005 before the Court began to tackle class-action issues of any
significance. During the October 2009 term, the Court issued its decision
in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.10
on the Erie Doctrine issue of whether Rule 23 trumps state limitations on
class actions that are “procedural.” In Shady Grove, the court extended
the Erie Doctrine by explaining the limits of state substantive law vis-àvis Rule 23.11 As pertinent to class actions, the thrust of Shady Grove is
that a state law granting substantive rights cannot bar class certification
under federal Rule 23 by including a provision that purports to preclude
class actions.12 The decision implicates the numerous state laws that
grant substantive rights to various groups and individuals but, in
exchange for those rights, bar any class-action claims forming under
those laws.
Additionally, during the October 2009 term, the Court decided
Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,13 which was the
first of many decisions addressing the interplay between private
arbitration rights and collective redress through class procedure. The
Stolt-Nielsen decision addressed the issue of whether courts could
require arbitration on a class-wide basis, and the Court’s answer was a
strong “no.”14 That broad holding indicated that there must be a
contractual basis to require class arbitration,15 a theory the court revisited
and expanded upon a few years later in Oxford Health Plans LLC v.
Sutter.16
Another decision during the term, Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank
Ltd.,17 did not address class actions directly but did address jurisdictional
issues that have great significance in class-action practice. Morrison
defined the jurisdictional boundaries for securities fraud class actions
under the Securities Exchange Act, limiting them to domestic
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 396 (2010).
Id. at 406-07.
Id. at 436.
Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666 (2010).
Id. at 684.
Id. at 664.
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2067 (U.S. 2013).
Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
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securities.18
B.

2010-2011

In the October 2010 term, the Court issued decisions likely to have
a lasting impact on the limiting of class actions. That year, the Court
decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,19 which significantly
strengthened private arbitration agreements as a defense against class
actions. The Court also issued the seminal Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes20 decision, which not only gave teeth to Rule 23’s commonality
requirement and clarified the standard for deciding whether Rule
23(b)(2) certification is available in cases in which monetary remedies
are sought, but was written in a tone that was openly antagonistic to
class actions.
While perhaps more practically impactful on the future viability of
class actions, at least in certain circumstances, Concepcion has been less
publicly heralded—or maligned depending on your persuasion—than
Dukes. Dukes remains the most politically controversial of the Court’s
class-action decisions, even though a critical analysis of the issues that
the Court clearly decided shows that the decision actually broke little
new ground compared to trends that were already developing in the
lower courts.
The Court also issued two plaintiff-friendly decisions during the
October 2010 term. In Smith v. Bayer,21 the Court limited the reach of
federal courts to dictate certification in state courts. The result is that a
federal court may not enjoin a state court from adjudicating class claims
even though the federal court may have previously denied Rule 23
certification on the same set of facts.22 Finally, in Erica P. John Funds v.
Halliburton (Halliburton I),23 the Court declined to impose barriers to
securities class actions by requiring plaintiffs to establish materiality on
the merits as a prerequisite to class certification.
C.

2011-2012
The October 2011 term was a hiatus for the Court in tackling class-

18. Id. at 273.
19. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (U.S. 2011).
20. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-51, 2557 (U.S. 2011).
21. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2371 (U.S. 2011).
22. Id. at 2373.
23. Erica P. John Funds, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (U.S. 2011)
[hereinafter Halliburton I].
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action issues. However, the Court issued another pro-arbitration
decision, Compucredit v. Greenwood,24 which continued the trend of
upholding agreements calling for individual arbitration in the face of
arguments that individual arbitration unfairly deprived litigants of a
“right” to pursue representative litigation in court.25 The October 2011
term also saw the Court miss an opportunity to provide meaningful
guidance on the requirements to obtain limited “issue” certification
when it declined review of Judge Posner’s decision in McReynolds v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.26
D.

2012-2013

The Court decided the most class-action-related cases in its October
2012 term, though these cases were arguably not nearly as influential
over class-action practice as the 2010-2011 decisions. During the
October 2012 term, the Court issued its decision in Amgen Inc. v.
Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds,27 which upheld a theme
previously reinforced by the Court in Halliburton I:28 that merits issues
need not be proven as a prerequisite to class certification. And in
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (Amex III),29 the
Court continued the trend of upholding arbitration clauses from attacks
that preventing class-action treatment was unfair.
The most practically impactful decision that term was probably
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles,30 in which the Court closed a key
loophole in federal jurisdiction under The Class Action Fairness Act
(“CAFA”). By closing this loophole, the Court prevented plaintiffs’
attorneys from simply stipulating to less than the $5 million
jurisdictional amount on behalf of a putative class to avoid removal.31
However, there were also a series of missed opportunities to
provide meaningful guidance on issues of significance to class-action

24. Compucredit v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (U.S. 2012).
25. Increasingly, arbitration agreements prohibit class arbitration, and the Court has held that
a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate on a class basis unless it expressly agrees to do so. StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664 (2010).
26. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (U.S. 2012).
27. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1188-89 (U.S.
2013).
28. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2183.
29. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (U.S. 2013).
30. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (U.S. 2013).
31. Id.
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litigators. First, in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,32 the Court initially
accepted review to address the standards for reviewing the reliability of
expert testimony at the class certification phase. Instead, the majority’s
decision relied heavily on the conclusion that the defendant had waived
the issue of whether a Daubert evidentiary standard33 should apply to
evaluating expert testimony at the class certification stage.34 Although
the decision does address a situation in which expert testimony may not
support class certification (when the expert opinion is completely
irrelevant to the question of whether common evidence exists), litigants
were left with uncertainty regarding whether a Daubert analysis is
required at the class certification phase.
Similarly, in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,35 the Court
sought to answer whether a full offer of judgment to a named
representative plaintiff mooted related class claims. But the Court relied
on the fact that the parties had stipulated that the individual claim was
moot rather than determining the circumstances under which mootness
would occur in the first place.36 As a result, the decision stands for the
unremarkable proposition that if a case is moot, it’s moot.
In a third case that ultimately hinged on a question of waiver or
stipulation, the Court issued its Oxford Health37 decision. There, the
Court upheld an arbitrator’s order as satisfying the lowest possible
standard of review.38 In doing so, the Court concluded that the defendant
had stipulated to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to decide the issue, leaving
open the much more practically relevant question of whether an
arbitrator or a court should decide, in the first instance, whether the
parties intended to allow class arbitration.39
Perhaps the two most impactful decisions on class-action practice
during the 2012-2013 term did not decide class-action procedural issues
at all but rather issues of federal subject matter jurisdiction. In Clapper
32. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (U.S. 2013) (Ginsburg, J., & Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
33. The Daubert standard is the evidentiary standard of reliability by which expert opinion
evidence based on scientific knowledge is admitted at trial. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
34. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435 (“In light of the model’s inability to bridge the differences
between supra-competitive prices in general and supra-competitive prices attributable to the
deterrence of overbuilding, Rule 23(b)(3) cannot authorize treating subscribers within the
Philadelphia cluster as members of a single class.”).
35. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1526-27 (U.S. 2013).
36. Id. at 1527.
37. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2065 (U.S. 2013).
38. Id. at 2065.
39. Id. at 2071.
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v. Amenesty International USA,40 the Court held that neither speculative
future injuries nor costs incurred to mitigate or avoid the risk of those
injuries, satisfy the Article III standing requirement. The Clapper
decision has been applied by many lower courts, particularly in the data
breach context, in rejecting class actions due to the lack of any injury-infact sufficient to support Article III standing. Similarly, the Court’s
decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,41 limiting federal court
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, continued the trend of closing
the doors of U.S. courts to foreign litigants seeking to take advantage of
the class-action procedure to vindicate collective rights, which began in
Morrison.42
E.

2013-2014

During the October 2013 term, the Court accepted only two classaction-related cases. Even so, it denied certiorari in another two cases
that provided perhaps the best opportunity yet to explore the question of
issue certification. By accepting certiorari review in Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II),43 the Court appeared poised to
revisit, and possibly overrule, the Basic Inc. v. Levinson44 presumption
of reliance in securities fraud on the market class actions. However, in
the end, the Court’s decision did not drastically change the analytical
framework set forth in Basic.45 Instead, it simply held that a defendant
should have an opportunity to rebut the presumption.46 The Court also
issued its second opinion interpreting CAFA during the term. In
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics,47 the Court held that parens
patriae cases brought by states on behalf of citizens are not “mass
actions” subject to CAFA.48
40. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (U.S. 2013).
41. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (U.S. 2013).
42. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 247 (2010).
43. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (U.S. 2014)
[hereinafter Halliburton II].
44. Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 225 (1988).
45. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2426.
46. Id. at 2404.
47. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 737 (U.S. 2014).
48. Below, the Fifth Circuit had split from the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and
agreed with the defendants that CAFA removal was permitted because the real parties in interest
were individual consumers in Mississippi. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701
F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2736 (U.S. 2013) (“At its core, this case
practically can be characterized as a kind of class action in which the State of Mississippi is the
class representative. By proceeding the way it has, the plaintiff class and its attorneys seek to avoid
the rigors associated with class actions (and avoid removal to federal court). . . . Because this suit is
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The Court passed up two chances to clarify class-action procedure
when it declined review of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in In re
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liability Litigation49
and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.50
Both cases provided excellent opportunities to consider the question of
“issue certification,” or the extent to which class certification is proper
when limited issues can be resolved on a class-wide basis, even if entire
claims cannot.
F.

2014-2015

The docket for the Court’s October 2014 term included only one
case with significance to class actions: Dart Cherokee Basin Operating
Co. v. Owens,51 a CAFA case in which the Court held that defendants do
not need to present evidence in support of a removal petition, but rather
must merely plead facts sufficient to justify federal jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act. The Court initially granted certiorari in
another case, Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi v.
IndyMac MBS,52 which presented questions about the scope of the
statute of limitations tolling under the American Pipe doctrine.53
However, the Court dismissed review as improvidently granted after the
parties reached a settlement.54
As of this writing, the Court has granted certiorari review of two
significant class action cases for its October 2015 terms. In CampbellEwald Company v. Gomez,55 the Court will revisit the issue of the extent
to which an offer of complete relief to a named plaintiff can moot a
putative class action. And in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,56 the Court will also
explore the boundaries of Article III standing in connection with
statutory damages claims, which are fertile ground for class action

a mass action under the terms of the CAFA, removal is proper.”).
49. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (U.S. 2014).
50. Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1277 (U.S. 2014).
51. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 549 (U.S. 2014).
52. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1515 (U.S. Mar. 10, 2014) (No. 13-640).
53. See generally Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
54. IndyMac MBS, 721 F.3d 95, cert. dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 42 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2014).
55. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W.
3637 (U.S. May 18, 2015) (No. 14-857).
56. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (U.S.
Apr. 27, 2015) (No. 13-1339).
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practitioners.
III. THE IMPACTS OF ROBERTS COURT DECISIONS ON DAY-TO-DAY
CLASS ACTION PRACTICE
The Roberts Court has been reluctant to issue sweeping opinions
that establish firm doctrinal rules governing class action practice.
Instead, the Court more often has simply decided the case in front of it
and left it to lower courts and lawyers to further fill in doctrinal gaps.
Perhaps the clearest example of this type of jurisprudence in the classaction context was reflected in the Comcast decision.57 In Comcast, the
Court clearly decided that the Third Circuit had erred in accepting
particular expert testimony as sufficient to support the conclusion that
damages could be determined on a common, class-wide basis in the case
before the Court.58 However, it left unclear whether common proof of
damages was always required in order to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s
predominance requirement.59 In the wake of the decision, defendants
began to argue that Comcast prevents certification any time damages are
individualized. These arguments have been largely unsuccessful in the
lower courts, which have interpreted Comcast as a narrow decision
limited to its facts and antitrust context.60
Although it is difficult to extract explicit practice guidance from
such narrowly-targeted decisions, some litigation lessons do emerge
when the Court’s jurisprudence is analyzed by the different categories of
cases. Despite the many missed opportunities for the Court to provide
meaningful guidance on practical issues that litigants in class actions
face regularly, there are some areas of class-action practice that have
changed significantly under the Court. These areas will be discussed
below in greater detail.
57. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432-33 (U.S. 2013).
58. Id. at 1433.
59. Id. at 1428.
60. At the appellate court level, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits both held that Comcast
required only a class-wide injury, not class-wide damages. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading
Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 860 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (U.S.
2014); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277
(U.S. 2014). In 2014, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits issued decisions reaffirming the class-wideinjury view. In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2014);
Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014). In Deepwater Horizon, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that “nothing in Comcast mandates a formula for [class-wide] measurement of
damages in all cases.” In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 815 (5th Cir. 2014). More recently,
the First and Second Circuits have both held that Comcast did not require uniformity of injury or
damages as a prerequisite to class certification. See Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401 (2d
Cir. 2015); In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015).
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Arbitration

One area of unquestionable change during the Roberts era has been
in the Court’s consistent decisions upholding private arbitration over any
right to collective redress. From the Court’s first significant class-actionrelated decision in Stolt-Nielsen in 2009 to its Amex III decision in 2013,
the Court has consistently upheld private arbitration clauses even in the
face of attacks that they deprive litigants of class action procedure and,
thereby, their right to justice.61
Concepcion was the first of a series of Supreme Court cases in
which the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) trumped
common law theories that could be used to invalidate agreements as
unconscionable for prohibiting class treatment of claims.62 Concepcion
made clear, in no uncertain terms, that state common law cannot be used
to invalidate an arbitration agreement as in violation of state public
policy, because it deprives a litigant of representative litigation
procedures.63 What’s more, the Concepcion decision could have been
based on a nuanced evaluation of the facts, but it was not.64 The
arbitration provision at issue in the case was decidedly consumer
friendly.65 For instance, it required AT&T to pay all non-frivolous
arbitration costs; AT&T agreed to conduct arbitration in the customer’s
county; the customer had the choice of arbitration method (in-person,
phone, or submissions) for claims of $10,000 or less; small-claims court
was not barred; the arbitrator was not limited in the form of individual
relief; and AT&T agreed to pay customers twice their attorneys’ fees if
they obtained more in arbitration than originally offered by AT&T.66 But
the Court’s decision did not hinge on the fact that the fairness of the
arbitration clause was at issue.67 Instead, the Court held categorically
that state laws holding arbitration clauses unconscionable are preempted
by the FAA.68 Lower courts following Concepcion have not necessarily
read the decision that broadly, with some focusing on the specific
consumer-friendly attributes of AT&T’s arbitration clause as a means of
distinguishing the Court’s decision.69 Nonetheless, Concepcion is
61. Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 663 (2010); Am. Express
Corp. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (U.S. 2013).
62. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742 (U.S. 2011).
63. Id. at 1755.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1744.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1746.
68. Id. at 1742.
69. See, e.g., Feeney v. Dell Inc., 28 Mass. L. Rptr. 652, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2013), rev’d
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probably the broadest, most generally stated, least fact-intensive decision
of the Court thus far.70
Amex III built upon the Concepcion decision, which as previously
discussed, clarified the preemptive force of the FAA vis-à-vis state
common law.71 In Amex III, the Court extended that concept to federal
law.72 Consistent with its holding in Concepcion, the Court “rigorously
enforced” the terms of the arbitration agreement and found the FAA
controlled in the face of federal, as well as state, statutes.73 The Court
noted that the only way to override the FAA’s provisions is by finding a
contrary congressional intent, which the Court noted did not exist in
federal antitrust laws.74
The Court also rejected the “effective vindication” argument based
on the idea that the economics of litigation would leave individual
plaintiffs without a practically effective way of vindicating their rights
absent a representative or group action procedure.75 Although the
plaintiffs determined the cost of individual arbitration outweighed their
statutory remedies, the Court noted that this did not waive their right to
pursue that remedy.76 Rather, the Court determined that every claim
brought under antitrust law is not guaranteed an affordable procedural
path to adjudicate.77
The only decision that bucks the trend of decidedly arbitrationfriendly decisions is the 2013 Oxford Health decision, where the Court
upheld an arbitrator’s decision to enforce class arbitration despite an
arbitration agreement that was arguably vague on the issue of class
arbitration.78 However, the Oxford Health decision also turned on the
analysis of a significant theme for the Roberts Court: the effect of a
particular party’s express waiver or consent.79 In Oxford Health, the
defendant waived the issue of whether the arbitrator had the power to
decide the issue of arbitrability, leaving the Court only to decide whether
the arbitrator’s decision to enforce class arbitration passed the minimally
exacting standard of whether the arbitrator’s decision was arbitrary and
993 N.E.2d 329 (Mass. 2013).
70. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1742.
71. Id. at 1752; Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309-10 (U.S.
2013).
72. Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct at 2309-10.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2309.
75. Id. at 2310.
76. Id. at 2308 n.5.
77. Id. at 2309.
78. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071 (U.S. 2013).
79. Id. at 2071.
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capricious, and avoiding the more generally impactful question of
whether the decision should have been made by the arbitrator in the first
place.80
Although originally viewed as a challenge to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Stolt–Nielsen,81 the Court noted a “stark contrast” between
Oxford Health and Stolt-Nielsen.82 In Stolt-Nielsen the parties stipulated
that they had not reached an agreement on class arbitration, so the
arbitrators did not have a contract to construe and could not identify any
agreement authorizing class proceedings.83 Thus, in Stolt-Nielsen, the
Court did not find that the arbitrator misinterpreted the contract, but
found that he abandoned his interpretive role.84 Conversely, in Oxford
Health, “the arbitrator did construe [a] contract . . ., and did find an
agreement to permit class arbitration.”85
The Oxford Health opinion leaves several key questions
unanswered. First, the Court indicated that it “would face a different
issue” had Oxford argued that the availability of class arbitration under
the contract was a “question of arbitrability,” an issue that the Court left
open in Stolt-Nielsen.86 The Court also quoted its opinion in Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle87 to the effect that questions of arbitrability,
which “include certain gateway matters, such as whether parties have a
valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly binding
arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy,” are
appropriate for courts to decide or review de novo.88
Of all the Roberts Court’s class-action-related decisions, its
decisions dealing with arbitration seem to have the single biggest impact
on limiting class-action litigation. Defendants who have direct contracts
with the consumers and might be in a position to sue them are now able
to limit their class action exposure. These decisions, combined with an
increase in the usage of arbitration clauses in consumer and employment
agreements, have undeniably impacted the viability of many class
actions, especially those in the areas of consumer fraud, products, and

80. Id. at 2066.
81. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 663 (2010) (finding an
arbitrator abused his powers by enforcing a class arbitration).
82. Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct. at 2070.
83. Id. at 2069-70.
84. Id. at 2070.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2068 n.2; see also Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 680 (making clear that the Court had
not yet decided whether the availability of class arbitration is a question of arbitrability).
87. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality opinion).
88. Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct. at 2068, n.2 (quoting Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 452).
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employment discrimination.89 However, contrary to the predictions of
some early commentators, they have not ended consumer class actions
as we know them.90 The difficulty in overcoming class arbitration
waivers in certain areas has simply led the plaintiffs’ bar to focus their
efforts on new class-action litigation, where arbitration agreements are
either prohibited or impractical (insurance, healthcare, data privacy,
antitrust, and retail products), or are against corporate defendants that,
for one reason or another, have not adopted class arbitration waivers.
Finally, despite the clarity and breadth of decisions like Concepcion
and Amex III, some lower courts have continued to find ways to strike
down specific class arbitration waivers.91 In particular, the Supreme
Court’s Concepcion and Amex III decisions have failed to stem the classaction tide in the employment sector, even where arbitration agreements
preclude collective actions. The National Labor Relations Board (“the
Board”), which enforces the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),
has taken a firm position that Section 7 of the NLRA protects
employees’ rights to pursue collective actions, even if they have signed
arbitration agreements that bar those very actions. The Board’s theory is
that the FAA’s policy of favoring arbitration, as described in
Concepcion and Amex III, is not sufficient to override the NLRA’s
policy of promoting collective action. After all, according to the Board’s
logic, “[T]he right to engage in collective action—including collective
legal action—is the core substantive right protected by the NLRA.”92
Concepcion’s reasoning does not apply to NLRA collective actions, the
Board argues, because Concepcion dealt with FAA preemption of state
common law. And Amex III does not apply because the NLRA contains
a Congressional command to preclude enforcement of class-action
waivers.93
89. See David Segal, A Rising Tide Against Class-Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/your-money/class-actions-face-hurdle-in-2011-supreme-courtruling.html?_r=0.
90. See Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/opinion/13fri1.html?_r=2.
91. See Jonathon L. Serafini, The Deception of Concepcion: Saving Unconscionability after
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 187, 212, 215 (2012) (citing courts that still
rely on unconscionability as permitted by the FAA to find arbitration agreements waiving class
procedures to be unenforceable as well as courts that find an absence of mutual assent in executing
the agreement). Despite Concepcion, “[o]ther contract principles under state law, such as those
governing the formation and interpretation of an agreement, may still pertain, subject to the
overarching objectives of the FAA.” NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d
777, 792 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
92. In re Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454, at *9 (2014).
93. Id. at *12, *21; see also In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274,
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But what circuit courts recognized was that the Supreme Court was
not writing in a vacuum when it decided Concepcion and Amex III.
Although neither case expressly addressed the relationship between the
FAA and the NLRA, lower courts interpreting the Board’s position have
taken their cues from Concepcion and Amex III to enforce class-action
waivers beyond the parameters of those two cases. Indeed, every circuit
court to consider it has rejected the Board’s theory that class waivers in
employment agreements are unenforceable based on NLRA policy.94
Meanwhile, the Board continues to enforce the NLRA to require
collective actions despite class waivers because it only views reversal by
the Supreme Court as binding. But no cases have reached the Supreme
Court because the Board, always on the losing side, has not petitioned
for review. If, and when, the Supreme Court considers the collision of
the FAA and the NLRA, it may be ready to write the next chapter on
class-action waivers in arbitration agreements. Until then, circuit courts
appear to be taking a uniform approach in expanding the Court’s
doctrine of enforcing arbitration agreements that bar class procedures.
B.

Class Action Fairness Act

The Supreme Court’s resolution of CAFA jurisdictional issues has
significantly affected the ways in which both plaintiffs and defendants
attempt to establish or refute federal jurisdiction in class actions.
Though, unlike its arbitration decisions, the Court’s decisions fall far
short of answering many of the questions that continue to arise in the
CAFA removal context. The Court’s opinions on CAFA issues have all
set forth clear rulings on defined legal issues, although the issues are
somewhat narrowly focused.
In AU Optronics, the Court emphasized the importance of the fact
that parens patriae actions are not “mass actions.”95 It also highlighted
that fact’s relevance to class actions in which there is parallel regulatory
action.96 However, these actions only represent a small subset of cases;
therefore, the vast majority of class-action litigation continues to be
driven by private attorneys.
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles answered an oft-arising question

at *16 (2012).
94. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 2013); Owen
v. Bristol Care Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1052-53 (2013); Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 734 F.3d
871, 873 (9th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 299 (2d Cir. 2013).
95. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 744-45 (U.S. 2014).
96. Id. at 743-44.
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of significant practical importance to litigants and lower court judges.97
This case served to close a loophole that threatened one of the key
objectives of CAFA, making federal jurisdiction available to defendants
who found themselves knee deep in rural outposts of state-court
jurisdictions where Rule 23 strictures on certification received short
shrift.98 Many plaintiffs’ attorneys understood that a damages stipulation
could both block federal removal and dissolve post-certification.
Standard Fire snuffed out the tactic.99
A unanimous Court explicitly ruled that a named plaintiff’s
stipulation to seek less than a $5 million jurisdictional threshold in a
putative class action could not be used to defeat federal removal
jurisdiction under CAFA.100 Because due process prevents a named
plaintiff from binding unnamed class members prior to class
certification, the Court recognized that a stipulation to seek less than $5
million is essentially meaningless.101 Justice Stephen Breyer’s opinion
laid down a bright line: damages stipulations that do not bind unnamed
class members must be ignored when analyzing the amount-incontroversy for removal jurisdiction under CAFA.102 “To hold
otherwise,” Justice Breyer wrote, “would, for CAFA jurisdictional
purposes, treat a nonbinding stipulation as if it were binding, exalt form
over substance, and run counter to CAFA’s primary objective: ensuring
‘Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance.’”103
However, although it answered a specific question of great
importance to class-action practitioners, the express language of the
Standard Fire opinion left open broader questions relating to the
standards with which lower courts should judge whether CAFA’s
amount in controversy threshold have been met.104
Perhaps the biggest post-Standard Fire question focused on the
standard of proof by which defendants had to show more than $5 million
in dispute to trigger CAFA removal jurisdiction. Before Standard Fire,
there was a split among circuit courts on whether a defendant had to
show $5 million in controversy by either preponderance of the evidence
97. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1347 (U.S. 2013).
98. Id. at 1346, 1348.
99. Id. at syllabus.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1348-49 (“a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members
of the proposed class before the class is certified”).
102. Id. at 1350.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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(i.e., Sixth and Eighth Circuits) or as a matter of legal certainty (i.e.,
Ninth and Third Circuits).105 Standard Fire, while striking down the
particular tactic of using damages stipulations as artificial bypasses to
CAFA jurisdiction, did not expressly address the level of required
proof.106 On the other hand, despite the lack of express language in the
Standard Fire decision on the applicable standard, lower courts have
taken the decision as at least a strong hint that the preponderance
standard was the correct one. In Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Services,
LLC,107 the Ninth Circuit overruled its longstanding precedent that a
defendant may remove pursuant to CAFA only when proving by a legal
certainty that more than $5 million is in dispute.
The Rodriguez court reasoned that Standard Fire had undercut the
framework that had previously established the Circuit’s legal certainty
test for CAFA removal.108 As a result, the court found that Standard Fire
effectively overruled prior Ninth Circuit precedent, bringing it in line
with the majority rule that a defendant must prove the amount in
controversy by a preponderance of the evidence.109
In other words, the Rodriguez court filled in Standard Fire’s
doctrinal gaps in a similar way that the circuit courts used Concepcion
and Amex III to respond to the NLRB’s position on class waivers in
arbitration agreements. That is, when the Court issues a class-action rule,
it is often the underlying principle behind the decision that has as much
influence going forward as the narrow ruling itself.
The Court’s 2015 decision in Dart Cherokee110 provided another
solution to a common issue facing practitioners in removed cases under
CAFA. There, the Court addressed the removal pleading standard and
whether a defendant had to attach to a removal notice fact declarations
or other “evidence” sufficient to prove jurisdiction. In fact, the
defendant’s burden is similar to a plaintiff’s pleading burden—a short,
plain statement will do.111 Further, only if the amount in controversy is
challenged is the defendant then required to prove jurisdiction exists by

105. Compare Frederick v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.
2012) (rejecting the legal certainty test) with Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994,
999 (9th Cir. 2007) (confirming legal certainty regime in Ninth Circuit before Standard Fire).
106. Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. 1345.
107. Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Serv., LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2013).
108. Id. at 981.
109. Id.
110. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (U.S. 2014) (“It
suffices to point out that no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which
Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.”).
111. Id. at 553.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/7

18

Karlsgodt and Dow: The Practical Approach

2015]

THE PRACTICAL APPROACH

901

a low preponderance of the evidence standard.112 The Court’s clear
decision that pleading facts that, if true, would be sufficient to establish
jurisdiction is enough to satisfy the pleading requirement significantly
clarifies the procedure and avoids a situation where a removing
defendant, out of an abundance of caution, had to prepare declarations
and even expert testimony before removing a class action under
CAFA.113
C.

Jurisdictional Decisions

Many of the Court’s key decisions impacting class-action practice
are not decisions that directly touch on class-action procedure itself. By
answering various questions relating to the scope of federal court
jurisdiction, the Court has quietly made a substantial mark with
significant class-action decisions that have effects well beyond the
narrow facts of the cases before the Court.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court issued strong decisions limiting the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts over foreign litigants in the Morrison
decision in 2010 and again in the Kiobel decision in 2013.114 In both
cases, the Court articulated and followed a specific legal framework for
analyzing whether Congressional enactments should have extraterritorial
reach.115
This approach culminated in Kiobel,116 when the Court held that the
presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. Courts also
applies to human rights cases filed under the Alien Torts Statute

112. Id.
113. Although it was much needed guidance from a practitioner’s perspective, the direct
holding in Dart Cherokee regarding the relevant CAFA removal standards was not particularly
controversial. The more controversial aspect of the case came in the form of a significant dispute
among the Justices on whether the Court should have heard the case at all. Id. In his dissent, Justice
Scalia pointed out that although the district court may have improperly remanded the case to state
court, the Tenth Circuit Court denied appellate review under the permissive review statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). Id. Thus, the actual controversy before the Court was the propriety of the
Tenth Circuit’s review denial—not the merits of the district court’s remand order. Id. at 558 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“Because we are reviewing the Tenth Circuit’s judgment, the only question before us
is whether the Tenth Circuit abused its discretion in denying Dart permission to appeal the District
Court’s remand order.”).
114. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (U.S. 2013).
115. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247; Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664-66.
116. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1660.
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(“ATS”). Prior to Kiobel, the ATS, a one-sentence, purely jurisdictional
statute, was a frequently-used vehicle for bringing international class
actions against both governmental and corporate defendants based on
alleged human rights abuses occurring throughout the world.117
The Kiobel decision continues a trend of limiting jurisdiction over
extraterritorial disputes.118 In all, the Supreme Court has made it clear
that a presumption against extraterritoriality applies absent clear
Congressional authorization to the contrary.
The Morrison and Kiobel decisions, taken together, have
significantly closed the doors of the federal courts, and favorable classaction procedure, to foreign litigants in two key areas of class-action
litigation: securities and human rights.119
2. Erie Doctrine
Sometimes a class-action case comes along where the Court is
presented with the opportunity to issue a ruling that appears to both
expand and cut back on class-action procedure. Shady Grove presented
that opportunity to the Court in 2010, resulting in an opinion that
expanded class-action jurisdiction in the case, while potentially culling
future class actions in other contexts.120
In a 5-4 decision with Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the
majority, the Court held that as long as a federal plaintiff satisfies Rule
23 certification requirements, a class can be certified.121 In Shady Grove,
a New York law permitted recovery of a penalty for violating a state
insurance law, but it did not permit recovery on a class basis.122 The
Supreme Court, following Scalia’s lead, struck down the state classaction bar on Erie grounds because the state procedural rule was
trumped by Rule 23.123 Indeed, Shady Grove stands as one of the most
significant pro class-action cases decided by the Court.
But there are limits to just how class-action-friendly the decision
has turned out to be in practice. Justice John Paul Stevens’ concurrence
suggested that Shady Grove may not have gone as far as Justice Scalia

117. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also Gonzalo Zeballos & Paul Karlsgodt, America’s
Closing Doors, CDR MAG. (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.cdr-news.co.uk/categories/expertviews/4624-americas-closing-doors.
118. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
119. Zeballos & Karlsgodt, supra note 117.
120. Shady Grove Orthopedic Ass’n, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 416 (2010).
121. Id. at 394.
122. Id. at 397.
123. Id. at 416.
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would have wanted in closing off state-based class-action bars under
certain laws.124 As Justice Stevens saw it, only those class action bars
that were purely procedural were vulnerable to succumbing to the
supremacy of Rule 23.125 But where the provision barring class
procedures was intertwined with the substance of the state class-action
bar, Justice Stevens said that under Erie, the state class-action bar must
stand.126 Because Shady Grove garnered a slim 5-4 majority, Justice
Stevens’ concurrence, which narrowed the holding, may end up being
more influential than Justice Scalia’s opinion.127 Perhaps most
interesting is that Shady Grove, like Wal-Mart and Comcast, illustrates
Justice Scalia’s continuing interest in explaining not only how Rule 23 is
supposed to work but also how it occupies an important place within
federal civil procedure.128 Where many might view Justice Scalia’s WalMart and Comcast opinions as an attempt to curtail Rule 23, Shady
Grove shows how he attempts to amplify its reach beyond what state
legislatures intend. Shady Grove remains a strong indicator that the
Court is most interested in finding the right balance and tone for class
litigation, rather than destroying it.
But Shady Grove was not all about expansion of class procedures.
The decision—and the justices who signed onto the majority opinion—
also indicated the Court’s preference for finding Rule 23 certification to
be a procedural mechanism as opposed to a substantive right.129 That
doctrinal position has important consequences for how lower courts
view access to class litigation, particularly in other contexts such as in
connection with class waivers.
3. Anti-Injunction Act
In Smith v. Bayer Corp., the Court issued a decision that instructed
class-action practitioners on the limits of federal power over state courts
adjudicating parallel class actions.130 In this case, a district court denied
certification of a class of prescription drug purchasers.131 The district
court then enjoined a state court in a separate case from certifying a class

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2375-82 (U.S. 2011).
Id. at 2374.
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based on a nearly-identical theory of the case.132 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the injunction, reasoning that despite the Anti-Injunction Act,
the relitigation exception of issue preclusion barred state-court
certification of a class that had already been denied certification in
federal court.133
The Supreme Court reversed.134 Primarily, the Court pointed out
that a state court can apply Rule 23 procedures in different ways than
federal court, so there was no reason for the district court to assume that
the certification questions were exactly the same in both cases.135 In fact,
“the West Virginia Supreme Court ha[d] disapproved the approach to
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement that the Federal District
Court embraced” in Bayer Corp.136 So, because the relevant legal
standards were so different, there was no basis for the district court to
circumvent the Anti-Injunction Act and interfere with the state-court
proceeding.137
The lesson is that if plaintiffs can bring two related, yet separate,
class actions in state and federal court, denial of certification in federal
court does not necessarily doom the state-court class. The procedural
complexity of Smith might limit its breadth because it is not easy to
understand the interplay between state and federal court; but for those
practitioners who put in the time to study the case, it can pay dividends
in knowing how to craft, or combat, a class.
4. Mootness
In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,138 the Court yet again
missed an opportunity to address an issue of great practical importance
due to a party’s waiver of an issue in the case before it.139 Genesis raised
the question whether a defendant in a representative action can avoid
class- or group-wide exposure by “picking off” the representative
plaintiffs’ claim.140 Specifically, the Court found that “the mere presence
of collective-action allegations in the complaint cannot save the suit
132. Id. at 2373.
133. Id. at 2370-71.
134. Id. at 2372.
135. Id. at 2377.
136. Id. at 2378 (emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 2382.
138. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (U.S. 2013).
139. Although Genesis involved an attempt to “pick off” the claim of a representative plaintiff
in an FLSA collective action and not a class action under Rule 23, the practice has become common
in both contexts. Id. at 1527.
140. Id.
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from mootness once the individual claim is satisfied,” but that holding is
limited in impact because of a concession that the offer did render the
claims moot.141
In Genesis, the plaintiff brought a Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) action to challenge Genesis’s policy of automatically
deducting 30 minutes per shift for meal breaks regardless of whether the
employee actually took the break.142 Simultaneously with its answer,
Genesis served a Rule 68 offer of judgment, which included $7,500 for
alleged unpaid wages and reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and
expenses.143 The offer was left open for 10 days, during which time the
plaintiffs did not respond.144 Genesis then moved for dismissal, which
the district court granted, finding that the plaintiffs’ claims were moot.145
The Third Circuit Court reversed the decision based on its’ concern that
the defendants could simply “pick off plaintiffs” in FLSA collective
actions, and remanded to allow the plaintiff to seek “conditional
certification.”146 However, all parties conceded, and the Third Circuit
did not dispute, that once the Rule 68 offer of judgment was made, the
named plaintiff’s case became moot even though the offer was not
accepted.147
Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent in Genesis explained why the case
may have limited application: the majority’s reasoning relied on the
truism that if a claim is moot, it’s moot, and the majority’s opinion left
the underlying question of whether an offer actually rendered a
plaintiff’s individual or representative claims moot to the lower courts.
As she stated, “[s]o a friendly suggestion to the Third Circuit: Rethink
your mootness-by-unaccepted-offer theory. And a note to all other courts
of appeals: Don’t try this at home.”148 Indeed, shortly after Genesis, the
Ninth Circuit held that “an unaccepted Rule 68 offer that would have
fully satisfied a plaintiff’s claim does not render that claim moot.”149
Shortly before this Article was finalized for publication, the Court
granted certiorari in another case raising the issue whether an offer of
full relief could moot class claims, this time directly in the class context.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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In Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,150 the Court may decide the standard
under which a court should determine whether an offer of judgment to
an individual plaintiff for the full amount of a statutory claim moots the
plaintiff’s ability to pursue class claims. Among the questions presented
is “[w]hether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power
of Article III, when the plaintiff receives an offer of complete relief on
his claim” and “[w]hether the answer to the first question is any different
when the plaintiff has asserted a class claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, but receives an offer of complete relief before any class is
certified.”151 On the other hand, the Court’s recent history suggests a
strong risk that one or more procedural barriers could ultimately prevent
a ruling on that key issue. Time will tell.
D.

Class Certification Decisions

Much commentary regarding the Court’s tolerance for class actions
has turned on its decisions affecting class certification standards.
Particularly, criticism has targeted the seemingly severe limitations that
Dukes placed on plaintiffs’ abilities to certify classes, followed by
Comcast’s even tighter squeeze.152
Those of us who have been in the trenches prosecuting or defending
class actions from the beginning of the Roberts Court era to the present
have no doubt seen significant changes in the ways that federal courts,
and state courts following the federal courts’ lead, address the class
certification question. Prior to 2005, conventional wisdom among many
judges was that class certification could be dealt with. Much of this
attitude had its roots in a long-standing misinterpretation of the Court’s
1974 decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,153 which many Courts
interpreted as preventing any kind of critical analysis into any factual
issues. Common refrains from plaintiffs’ attorneys and courts included
the likes of: assume the allegations in the pleadings are true; certify first
and ask questions later; and variations in “damages” do not destroy
predominance if “liability” can be determined on a class wide basis.

150. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W.
3637 (U.S. May 18, 2015) (No. 14-857).
151. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Campbell-Ewald, 83 U.S.L.W. 3637, 2015 WL 241891,
at *i.
152. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 778
(2013); John Campbell, Unprotected Class: Five Decisions, Five Justices, and Wholesale Change to
Class Action Law, 13 WYO. L. REV. 463, 465 (2013); Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search For
Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 699 (2014).
153. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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There can be no doubt now that Eisen is “dead” in that these
misinterpretations of the ruling have been discredited, and the idea of a
“rigorous analysis” of class certification now actually means something.
Courts increasingly require significant discovery before addressing class
certification. Multiple-day evidentiary hearings are often held in the
place of perfunctory decisions on the papers or after a brief oral
argument. Expert testimony is increasingly scrutinized.
But a close look at the Court’s class-certification decisions does not
necessarily support the conclusion that the Supreme Court killed Eisen.
The Court’s decisions did not truly break new doctrinal ground that was
significantly different than the ground already being broken by the lower
courts at the time that they were decided. Moreover, rather than
establishing black-letter rules, the common theme among most of the
decisions is that they have turned on particular facts or idiosyncrasies in
the lower court record. The Court has also declined numerous
opportunities to set new, clear standards on the elements of class
certification and the nature and quantum of proof required to satisfy
those elements. And where the Court has articulated what appear to be
firm rules, it often reflects a stamp of approval on standards that have
been in place throughout the federal system for some time.
1. The Securities Cases
In one sense, the Amgen, Halliburton I, and Halliburton II
decisions can be seen to represent the Court’s endorsement of the blackletter rule that a plaintiff should not be required to prove an element on
the merits as a precondition to class certification.154 However, in all of
these cases, the Court essentially applies existing legal principles to the
facts to reach that result.155
In Halliburton I, for instance, the Court held that to certify a class
of securities plaintiffs, proof is required to show the market efficiency
regarding the particular stock at issue.156 In Amgen, the Court held that
10b-5 securities plaintiffs can obtain class certification without proving
the materiality of the alleged stock misrepresentation.157 The Court also
held that defendants are not entitled to present evidence of an absence of

154. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (U.S. 2013);
Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (U.S. 2011); Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2406 (U.S. 2014).
155. Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1191; Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2184-87; Halliburton II, 134
S. Ct. at 2402-05.
156. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2185.
157. Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1197.
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materiality at the class certification stage to defeat certification.158
Emphasizing that the presence or absence of materiality must be
determined on an objective basis, the Court further stated that
certification examines for issues that are common to all class members:
“As to materiality, therefore, the class is entirely cohesive: It will prevail
or fall in unison. In no event will the individual circumstances of
particular class members bear on the inquiry.”159 Halliburton I allowed
the Court to decide Amgen in this manner because a fraud-on-the-market
theory presumes that an efficient market will rely on material
misrepresentations aired to the general public.160
Both Halliburton I and Amgen hinted at, but did not address, the
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson presumption—which presumes reliance for a
class of investors alleging financial losses because of misleading stock
information.161 That question was reserved for Halliburton II.162 While
Halliburton II did not overturn the Basic reliance presumption, the Court
did hold that before a class can be certified, defendants must be provided
a chance to rebut the Basic presumption.163
In the end, the trio of cases laid down procedural markers for
plaintiffs and defendants battling certification in securities cases; but the
decisions did not offer much in the way of practical takeaways for
general class-action practitioners aside from more cases to cite for the
long-standing proposition (which even Eisen can still be fairly cited to
support) that a plaintiff does not have to prove any of the elements of his
or her claims on the merits as a prerequisite to class certification.164
2. Dukes: Class-Action Killer or Reflection of Contemporary
Standards?
Dukes has been referred to as the “death of Eisen.”165 More

158. Id. at 1204.
159. Id. at 1191.
160. Id. at 1192.
161. Id. at 1192 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (2013)); Halliburton I,
131 S. Ct. at 2181-82 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-47); Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
162. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (U.S. 2014).
163. Id. at 2404.
164. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 157-58 (1974); Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. at
1191; Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2183; Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2406.
165. See Paul Karlsgodt, Class Action CLE Recap: Insights on the 2012-13 Supreme Court
Term From the Bench and Both Sides of the Bar, CLASSACTIONBLAWG (May 14, 2013),
http://classactionblawg.com/2013/05/14/class-action-cle-recap-insights-on-the-2012-13-supremecourt-term-from-the-bench-and-both-sides-of-the-bar/; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131
S. Ct. 2541, 2564 n.6 (U.S. 2011).
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accurately, Dukes was simply the first time that the Supreme Court, like
many lower courts before it, expressly stated that Eisen should not be
interpreted to prevent any examination of facts in assessing class
certification simply because those facts might be relevant to merits
questions that may overlap with class certification questions. In fact, just
prior to Dukes, there was a growing body of circuit decisions that had
already rejected the idea that questions overlapping with the merits were
off limits, including the Ninth Circuit’s decision below in Dukes166 itself
(which is discussed in more detail below). In 2006, for instance, the
Second Circuit rejected the premise that a district court had to avoid
merits considerations when it made class certification decisions.167
What’s more, the court applied a rigorous Rule 23 approach with respect
to the 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry that the Supreme Court later
reflected in Dukes and Comcast.168
Likewise, the Third Circuit in 2008 said that Eisen did not preclude
a court from looking at merits issues when making a class certification
decision.169 Rather, Eisen merely barred “a merits inquiry that is not
necessary to determine a Rule 23 requirement.”170 Citing de rigueur
class certification standards, the court explained that “[b]ecause the
decision whether to certify a class ‘requires a thorough examination of
the factual and legal allegations,’ the court’s rigorous analysis may
include a ‘preliminary inquiry into the merits,’ and the court may
‘consider the substantive elements of the plaintiffs’ case in order to
envision the form that a trial on those issues would take.’”171 Thus, the
idea that a merits inquiry could overlap a class certification examination
was well entrenched before Dukes because lower courts understood the
limitations of Eisen.
A second key contribution attributed to Dukes, which was more of a
trend already started within the lower courts, was its rejection of the idea
of “trial by formula.” However, district courts had also rejected
plaintiffs’ attempts to improperly conduct trial-by-formula class
certification well before Justice Scalia cast a more highly publicized
166. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010).
167. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006), clarified on denial
of reh’g, 483 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007) (“we decline to follow the dictum in Heerwagen suggesting
that a district judge may not weigh conflicting evidence and determine the existence of a Rule 23
requirement just because that requirement is identical to an issue on the merits”).
168. Id.
169. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 317 (3d Cir. 2008) (as amended
Jan. 16, 2009).
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 166 (1974)).
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dark shadow over the practice in the Dukes opinion. In fact, in a 2009
Title VII case similar to Dukes, the Eastern District of Michigan denied
class certification because plaintiffs’ theory of the case relied on vague
statistical proof that different managers throughout a large company
engaged in discriminatory employment practices.172 But as in Dukes, two
years later, the vast discrepancies among the various locations
“undermine[d] a conclusion that the statistics are sufficient to
demonstrate that there is a common, class-wide discriminatory impact
against the putative class members.”173 In addition, the court determined
that Rule 23(b)(2) certification would have been completely improper
because the plaintiffs sought far more than just injunctive relief—they
sought back pay and front pay in the form of substantial money
damages.174 So a major thrust of Dukes was actually applied as a matter
of course by a district court two years before Justice Scalia’s opinion
purportedly shook up the class-action bar, and therefore, Dukes
represents more of a stamp of approval on the trend in the lower courts
rather than a sea change in the standards impacting class-action practice.
The main original contribution of the Dukes opinion to class action
jurisprudence was to give teeth to the commonality element of Rule
23(a).175 Before Dukes, courts widely accepted the notation that just
about any common issue would satisfy the commonality element, so the
element was being litigated less and less frequently. Justice Scalia
challenged this conventional wisdom by using the commonality element
as the primary vehicle for finding that the class in Dukes should not have
been certified even under Rule 23(b)(2), which does not require the more
exacting “predominance” of common issues.176 After Dukes, what used
to be a foregone conclusion now requires some analysis. However, in the
context of damages class actions, where predominance is required
anyway, giving the commonality element teeth does not significantly
change the practical challenges of seeking or defending class
certification.
Much of the remainder of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in
Dukes is little more than a teaser. The Court unanimously held—like the
172. Serrano v. Cintas Corp., No. CIV. 04-40132, 2009 WL 910702, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
31, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2013).
173. Id.
174. Id. at *10 (“If the nature of the damages calculations is individualized and if the proposed
class members have an ability to bring individual actions, the damages claims ‘necessarily
predominate over requested declaratory or injunctive relief’ and the requested damages cannot be
recovered pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2).”).
175. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-51 (U.S. 2011).
176. Id. at 2559.
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Eastern District of Michigan—that Rule 23(b)(2) certification was
inappropriate in the specific case before it because the plaintiffs’
ultimate goal was the recovery of monetary relief in the form of back
pay.177 The Court recognized that the test for whether Rule 23(b)(2)
certification is appropriate is whether monetary relief is “incidental” to
the injunctive or declaratory relief sought. However, Dukes was an easy
case, therefore the Court did not go further in setting a framework for
determining whether relief is “incidental” in a broader sense.178 The
Court also suggested, but did not decide, that expert testimony should be
subject to a Daubert standard in order to be accepted at the class
certification phase.179 Instead, Justice Scalia engaged in pages of detailed
scrutiny of the specific expert testimony presented by the plaintiffs to
support their theory of class-wide discrimination, an approach that
would later be repeated in the Comcast case.180 Similarly, the Court
“disapproved” of the idea of a “trial by formula” but did not provide a
specific rule prohibiting statistical proof as a proxy for common
evidence in class actions, nor did it set forth any standards by which the
reliability of statistical proof should be evaluated.181 In short, Justice
Scalia did not hide his disdain for class actions, but he fell far short of
announcing any bright-line rules or legal standards that would
substantially curtail class actions in the future.
On the other hand, there is little doubt that Dukes provided the
foundational language upon which many class certification decisions
since have been based, either granting or denying certification, even if
the formal holding of the decision is somewhat narrow in scope. When
the final word on the Court’s treatment of class actions is written, Dukes
will no doubt figure prominently.
Indeed, Dukes already provides decisional framework for lower
courts that both grant and deny class certification motions. In one of the
more noteworthy post-Dukes cases, the Third Circuit relied on Dukes’
aggressive pursuit of commonality to deny certification when plaintiffs
could not establish a reliable means of identifying class members.182
Without adequate identification, they could not show any common
questions were capable of common answers, as required by Dukes.183

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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In that case, Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,184 plaintiffs sought to certify
an advertising class based on claims that Bayer falsely advertised its
One-a-Day WeightSmart dietary supplement (“WeightSmart”). Bayer
objected to class certification, arguing that it would be impossible to
ascertain the members of the class due to a lack of proof about whether
putative class members had, in fact, purchased the product.185
The court held that the plaintiff was required to demonstrate an
“administratively feasible” means of identifying who purchased
WeightSmart—one that did not require mini-trials or individualized factfinding as to each putative member of the class.186 The plaintiff sought to
satisfy his burden by relying on retailer records and affidavits submitted
by class members attesting to their purchases of WeightSmart.187 The
court rejected both methods, reasoning that the plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate any evidence that retailer records existed that would allow
for the identification of purchasers and that affidavits are insufficient to
prove membership in the class.188
The language of Dukes, however, can also be used to support class
certification. As the Court explained, “for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2),
even a single common question will do” to support certification.189 In
September 2014, the Ninth Circuit relied on that language to certify a
class of employees who alleged their employer’s policy of requiring offthe-clock, unpaid, overtime work violated state law.190 The employer
argued certification was improper after Dukes because too many
individualized questions overwhelmed the common issues and
threatened to violate the employer’s right to due process.191 But the
Ninth Circuit disagreed.192 It emphasized that Dukes requires only a
single common question, and in Jimenez, there were at least three
common issues that targeted the employer’s liability: whether there was
an unofficial company policy of discouraging reporting of overtime;
whether the company knew about it; and whether it stood idly by while
employees worked without getting paid.193
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that none of the trial-by184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 304.
Id.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (U.S. 2011).
Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1164.
Id.
Id. at 1163-64.
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formula problems in Dukes prevented certification in Jimenez because a
statistical sampling method of certification could be used “so long as the
use of these techniques is not expanded into the realm of damages.”194
Dukes’ subsidiary holding—that Rule 23(b)(2) classes cannot
pursue non-incidental monetary relief on an individual basis—has also
been widely recognized by courts, although it was not a controversial
issue prior to Dukes.195 Since Dukes, however, some courts have
tightened restrictions on the scope of 23(b)(2) classes they will permit to
be certified.196
3. Comcast: Extension of Dukes, or Not?
Just two years after the Dukes decision, the Court seemed poised to
issue its next game-changing class certification decision when it
accepted review in Comcast.197 Comcast reinforced the trend established
in Dukes that, to certify a class, plaintiffs must be able to demonstrate
that a case is susceptible to resolution by common proof.198 Again,
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in a factually detailed decision that
was seemingly broad in scope in making class certification more
difficult.199 The Comcast decision held that Dukes’ requirement that trial
courts undertake a “rigorous analysis” applied not just to the four
elements of Rule 23(a), but to Rule 23(b)’s as well—including
predominance.200 The majority concluded that an action cannot be
certified under Rule 23(b)(3) for class treatment when it is evident that
“individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions
common to the class.”201
Defendants seized upon this language in arguing to the lower courts
that the predominance element can never be satisfied when there are
individualized damages issues. Several lower courts have declined to
give Comcast this broad interpretation, pointing out that the Court’s
decision was impacted significantly by the fact that the lower court had
approved certification of a class to decide both the question of liability

194. Id. at 1167.
195. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (U.S. 2011).
196. See Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 464 F. App’x 636, 637 (9th Cir. 2011) (changing
result from reversal to affirming certification denial on rehearing because Dukes “explicitly adopted
the ‘not incidental’ test for certification under Rule 23(b)(2).”).
197. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431 (U.S. 2013).
198. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551; Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432.
199. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1429.
200. Id. at 1432.
201. Id. at 1433.
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and the question of damages.202
In the end, a synthesis of the Court’s decisions on the class
certification standards cases provides a helpful tone emphasizing the
need for a rigorous analysis to ensure that the plaintiff can prove
common issues through common evidence. It also provides some strong
illustrations of issues that will prevent class certification. However, not
one case announced any significant new rule or mode of analysis.
Instead, the emphasis that Dukes and Comcast placed on closely
analyzing class certification methods have re-confirmed the importance
for lower courts to strictly follow the Rule 23 requirements when
making certification decisions. But neither Dukes nor Comcast
significantly altered those requirements through their direct holdings.
The decisions do emphasize that the details matter—quite possibly now
more than ever before.
IV. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
Perhaps the most significant feature of the Court when it comes to
class actions is the number of opportunities that the Court has passed up
to address issues of significance to trial courts and practitioners.
Through denials of certiorari or limited holdings, the Court has declined
to address a variety of key issues including issue certification, the
standards governing admissibility of expert testimony at the class
certification phase, the standards governing approval of class-action
settlements, and the standards governing FLSA collective actions.
A.

Issue Certification
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in McReynolds203 in 2012 and

202. Among the notable lower-court limitations of Comcast are the “moldy washing machine”
cases. In those cases, both the Seventh and Sixth Circuit held, on remand orders from the Supreme
Court for reconsideration in light of Comcast, that Comcast did not require denial of certification
even though only a tiny percentage of the putative class members experienced the defective washing
machines at issue in the cases. As Judge Posner explained, Comcast’s focus on predominance and
tying damages theory to class-wide measurement did not change the fact that plaintiffs alleged a
uniform liability question that could be certified: “There is a single, central, common issue of
liability: whether the Sears washing machine was defective.” Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727
F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (U.S. 2014); see also In re Whirlpool
Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 860 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied
134 S. Ct. 1277 (U.S. 2014) (“To the extent that Comcast Corp. reaffirms the settled rule that
liability issues relating to injury must be susceptible of proof on a classwide basis to meet the
predominance standard, our opinion thoroughly demonstrates why that requirement is met in this
case.”).
203. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
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Allstate v. Jacobsen204 in 2014. In both cases, plaintiffs sought to certify
classes on liability that merely set the stage for further individualized
damages claims.205 The Seventh Circuit and the Montana Supreme Court
condoned both attempts as permissible under Rule 23.206 The certiorari
denial kept this door open for plaintiffs’ attorneys who could use issue
certification to drive large settlements.
B.

Daubert and Expert Admissibility Standards

Following Dukes, the Court had various opportunities to address
issues surrounding expert evidence standards. For example, in Comcast,
the Court originally accepted certiorari to address “[w]hether a district
court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff
class had introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to
show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide
basis.”207 This led the parties to devote a majority of their briefing to the
question of whether a Daubert analysis is required before a court can
accept expert testimony submitted in support of a motion for class
certification, which is an issue of great importance to class-action
practitioners and trial courts.208 However, as Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer pointed out in dissent, arguing that review should have been
dismissed altogether, the Court was ultimately unable to resolve that
question because the defendant had not preserved its objections to the
admissibility of the proffered expert testimony.209 As a result, Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion does not address Daubert at all, but rather
concludes that the expert’s opinion in that particular case did not pass
muster because it did not address the right issues.210
When the Court denied certiorari of the Whirlpool washing
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (U.S. 2012).
204. Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 310 P.3d 452 (Mont. 2013), reh’g denied (Oct. 8, 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2135 (U.S. 2014).
205. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 483; Jacobsen, 310 P.3d at 468.
206. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 492; Jacobsen, 310 P.3d at 479. Interestingly, the Ohio
Supreme Court arrived at a contrary conclusion, recently holding that pursuant to Dukes’ logic, a
class may not be certified as to a single issue solely for the purpose of setting up individualized
damage claims. Cullen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St.3d 373, 2013-Ohio-4733,
999 N.E.2d 614, at ¶ 27 (rejecting certification of claims for declaratory relief that “merely lay a
foundation for subsequent determinations regarding liability or that facilitate an award of
damages”).
207. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (U.S. 2013) (Ginsburg, J., & Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1435-36.
210. Id. at 1426.
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machine cases, after vacating and remanding the first time around, it
signaled that Comcast did not have the full breadth to limit facially
unwieldy classes that the defense bar was hoping for. On remand, both
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits concluded that Comcast did not preclude
class certification just because some—if not most—of the purchasers of
defective washing machines may never have experienced any
problems.211 The Supreme Court left these decisions standing by
denying certiorari, indicating that at least in the consumer products
sector, plaintiffs’ attorneys have wide latitude to establish common
injuries without having to worry about Comcast’s influence on
potentially varied damages.212
C.

Settlement Standards: A Potential New Class-Action Target

For a Supreme Court noticeably curious about the contours of classaction procedure, principles of class settlements appear to be fertile
ground for carving clearer boundaries. Indeed, in November 2013, Chief
Justice Roberts indicated on the record that the Court may begin looking
into the appropriateness of a certain type of settlement. Frequently,
because settlements involve negligible-at-best remedies for individual
class members, settlement agreements will specify that the monetary
benefit be distributed to a third party. These cy pres remedies are
designed to provide an “as near as possible” benefit to the class
members. Increasingly, however, they are coming under fire as a symbol
of abusive class litigation that benefits plaintiffs’ attorneys and
defendants while leaving class members with little to no individual
relief.213
And so it was especially noteworthy when the Chief Justice wrote a
four-page statement accompanying a certiorari denial in Marek v.
Lane.214 Marek challenged Facebook’s “Beacon” program, a feature that
automatically collected user data and activity and posted it to people’s

211. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 860
(6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (U.S. 2014); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d
796, 800 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (U.S. 2014).
212. Whirlpool, 722 F.3d 838; Butler, 727 F.3d 796.
213. See Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian, & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the
Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617
(2010); see also U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE NEW LAWSUIT ECOSYSTEM:
TRENDS,
TARGETS,
AND
PLAYERS
(2013),
available
at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/The_New_Lawsuit_Ecosystem_pages_web.
pdf.
214. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 8 (U.S. 2013) (Statement of Roberts, C. J.).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/7

34

Karlsgodt and Dow: The Practical Approach

2015]

THE PRACTICAL APPROACH

917

profiles.215 The program caused a public relations misstep, prompting
Facebook to reprogram Beacon so that it did not automatically report the
data without affirmative user consent.216
Several individuals sued Facebook in a putative class action,
alleging federal and state privacy law violations and seeking damages
and equitable relief, including an injunction to shut down Beacon.217 The
putative class was limited to individuals whose information was publicly
disclosed during the month that Beacon’s automatic settings triggered
the alleged violations.218 Before class certification, the named plaintiffs
settled in exchange for Facebook’s promise to suspend Beacon and $9.5
million.219 Plaintiffs’ class counsel received nearly a quarter of the fund,
and named plaintiffs received “modest incentive payments.”220 The
remaining $6.5 million—rather than distributed to unnamed class
members—was “earmarked” for a cy pres remedy.221 The parties agreed
that the cy pres remedy would fund an organization, run in part by
Facebook, devoted to educating the public about online privacy.222
Megan Marek and three unnamed class members challenged the
settlement as not serving the interests of the class.223 The district court
and a divided Ninth Circuit panel rejected the objection.224
Chief Justice Roberts explained that while he agreed with denying
the petition, the growing specter of cy pres remedies in class settlements
presented “fundamental concerns surrounding the use of such remedies
in class litigation, including when, if ever, such relief should be
considered.”225 “In a suitable case,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “this
Court may need to clarify the limits on the use of such remedies.”226
Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts’ “fundamental” concerns turn on
familiar class-action issues for the Court such as assessing the fairness of
the remedy, what roles the judge and parties should play in shaping the
remedy, and protection of the class-members interests.227 Are they
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 9. The parties also agreed to expand the settlement class to parties injured after
Facebook altered the opt-in requirement following the initial roll-out month.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012)).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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adequately protected by the selected organization’s goals?228 Most
importantly, Chief Justice Roberts signaled that settlement fairness may
be the next issue on the Supreme Court’s class-action agenda.229 Cy Pres
issues are often fact-sensitive, and so a body of appellate case law is
unlikely to form based on Chief Justice Roberts’ statement. However,
the Supreme Court could well be willing and interested in laying out
general principles to limit the remedy in the same manner that it has
waded into Rule 23 certification.230
D.

Limits on Class-Action Cutbacks in the Employment Sector

Whatever boundary lines the Court has drawn around class
litigation, they have largely been limited to circumscribing the scope of
Rule 23 actions. And as already discussed, those limits are more
theoretical than practical considering the enduring growth of the class
litigation industry. But the Court has yet to seriously wade into
fashioning certification rules for class litigation under an equally-potent
class device—the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).
The FLSA231 provides a class litigation structure for employmentrelated claims based on wage-and-hour disputes. As a centerpiece of the
New Deal, Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 as a means to allow one
employee to sue on behalf of other “similarly situated” employees.232 It
is distinct from Rule 23 in that class members—i.e., employees—must
affirmatively opt in to the litigation by written consent that is filed with
the court.233
That procedural difference has created a thriving industry in which
FLSA collective actions have increased by 438 percent since 2000.234
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. In 2010, the Court reversed a district court’s enhancement, by 75 percent, of an attorney’s
fee award pursuant to a fee-shifting statute in a civil rights class action. Perdue v. Kenny A., 559
U.S. 542 (2010). Although Perdue was a class action, the legal reasoning behind the decision was
limited to federal fee-shifting statutes and did not indicate any broad applicability to class-action
settlement funds generally. See Lambrecht v. Taurel, No. 1:08-CV-68-WTL-TAB, 2010 WL
2985946, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. June 8, 2010), report & recommendation adopted, No. 1:08-CV-68WTL-TAB, 2010 WL 2985943 (S.D. Ind. July 27, 2010) (holding that Perdue did not apply to a
common-fund class-action settlement).
231. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Ed Silverstein, Record Number of Federal Wage and Hour Lawsuits Filed Under the
COUNSEL
(May
21,
2014),
Fair
Labor
Standards
Act,
INSIDE
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/05/21/record-number-of-federal-wage-and-hour-lawsuits-fi. A
record 8,126 FLSA cases were filed between April 1, 2013, and March 31, 2014, a nearly 5 percent
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Indeed, from 1991 to 2012, the increase in FLSA lawsuits (1,327 to
8,148) had eclipsed the 500 percent threshold according to 2014
Government Accountability Office figures.235 The rapid increase has
followed the 1989 Supreme Court Hoffman-LaRoche v. Sperling236
decision, which bestowed certification discretion to district court judges
and led to a two-step certification process that has developed among the
lower courts.237
At the outset, plaintiffs seek “conditional certification,” a relatively
easy bar to clear that leads to class-wide certification and the
commencement of costly discovery. During the post-conditionalcertification stage, discovery often involves in-depth examination of the
employees who opt in to the action, exploring the extent to which they
are similarly situated. Relevant inquiries often include probing the actual
job duties of the different employees and searching through corporate
files for evidence of a company policy that violates the FLSA in a way
that is common to the class. The burden and expense places downward
pressure on employers to settle, and creates incentives for plaintiffs’
attorneys to file collective actions without reliable knowledge as to the
merits.238
After class discovery, the decertification or final certification stage
determines whether the action will proceed on a class basis. Although
the technical requirements differ from Rule 23, the examination of the
appropriateness of class treatment at the decertification stage is
fundamentally similar to Rule 23.239 In other words, after discovery,
courts examine whether the class is sufficiently similar to justify class
increase from the prior year.
235. Federal Wage Structure: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the
H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Andrew Sherrill, Director,
Education, Workforce, and Income Security, United States Gov. Accountability Office), 2014 WL
3612663.
236. Hoffman-LaRoche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 165 (1989).
237. The foremost approach was developed at the district court level without any roadmap or
guidance from appellate courts. See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351, 358-59 (D.N.J. 1987).
238. LINDBERGH PORTER, JR., NAT’L EMP’T LAW COUNCIL, THE FLSA TWO-STEP IS ONE
TOO MANY: THE APPLICATION OF DUKES AND THE RULES ENABLING ACT TO COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
2
(2013),
available
at
http://www.nationalemploymentlawcouncil.org/nonmember/
agenda_PDFs/2013/Wage_and_Hour_Litigation.pdf (“Conditional certification places enormous
pressure on employers to settle claims prior to obtaining a ruling on decertification, much less the
merits.”).
239. “Indeed, despite the difference between a collective action and a class action and the
absence from the collective-action section of the Fair Labor Standards Act of the kind of detailed
procedural provisions found in Rule 23, there isn’t a good reason to have different standards for the
certification of the two different types of action.” Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d
770, 772 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted).
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litigation.
Although the Supreme Court has outlined the proper procedures for
Rule 23 certification, it has never addressed this two-step FLSA
certification process. Impliedly, the Court condoned it when it denied
certiorari of two cases in 2010 and 2011 that offered the Court a chance
to curtail the culture of certify first, ask questions later. The Court’s
silence thus far has enabled this class-friendly method to persist, leading
to increasingly aggressive class-action filings.240
In 2009, Family Dollar Stores, Inc. v. Morgan expressly presented
the FLSA certification procedure issue to the Court.241 The petition for
certiorari noted that the Court had recently “dramatically clarified how
Rule 23(b) class actions operate.”242 Accordingly, the petitioners
requested that the Court “intervene to provide similar guidance
concerning the procedural standards that should govern § 216(b) class
actions.”243
The Court, evidently, was not convinced that FLSA certification
procedures needed curtailment or refining. In October 2009, the Court
denied certiorari, leaving in place an Eleventh Circuit opinion,244 which
approved of the two-step certification process that was derived almost
entirely from a 1987 District of New Jersey case.245 Two years later, the
Court again denied certiorari when another collective action presented
an opportunity to clarify the procedural outline for certification.246
The refusal by the Court to engage in FLSA certification is curious
considering its apparent interest in class litigation. Time and again, the
Court has defined the contours of Rule 23 certification, focusing intently
on due process. The difference may be in the opt-in structure of FLSA,
which removes due process concerns regarding class members who
affirmatively agree to class representation. But the approach does not
240. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *22, Family Dollar Stores, Inc. v. Morgan, 558
U.S. 816 (2009), 2009 WL 1061250 (“Continuing uncertainty over how the executive exemption
applies to retail store managers forces employers to settle rather than risk their business model on
litigation of one collective action on behalf of thousands of employees before one jury.”); see also
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, HCR ManorCare, Inc. v. Zouhary, 132 S. Ct. 1146 (U.S. 2012),
2011 WL 5928338 (presenting the question whether the “two-step procedure” is “in conflict with
the joinder requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically those of Rules 20
and/or 23.”).
241. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *i, Family Dollar Stores, 558 U.S. 816.
242. Id. at *29.
243. Id. at *30.
244. Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1260 (2008).
245. Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351, 370-71 (D.N.J. 1987).
246. Hertz Corp. v. Myers, 132 S. Ct. 368 (U.S. 2011); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hertz
Corp. v. Myers, 132 S. Ct. 368 (U.S. 2011), 2011 WL 2165435.
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address the due process implications for defendants who face obstacles
in litigating individualized defenses when looking down the barrel of a
Rule 23 or FLSA action. Fairness is as much of a component of a Rule
23 defense as it is a defense of a sprawling wage-and-hour action under
FLSA. The Court’s reluctance to wade into FLSA procedure illustrates
the limits it is not yet willing to place on class litigation, particularly in
the employment context.
V. CONCLUSION
There can be little question that class-action practice has changed
over the past decade. However, there is significant room for debating
how significant the Supreme Court’s role was in dictating this change.
The Court’s decisions reflect a tone of encouragement for reform and, in
some cases, limited correction of abuses of the class-action vehicle; but
the Court has for the most part not mandated drastic changes to classaction procedure.
The future of jurisprudence in the Court is murky. Notwithstanding
several opportunities to address key class-action issues, the volume of
class-action cases selected for review has slowed in recent years
following an active period between 2009 and 2012. This may merely be
a lull or a sign that the Court has said all it intends to say on class
actions. Of course, this is not a situation that calls for a channeling of
Charles Holland Duell.247 It is not hard to imagine that the Court could—
and will—continue to chisel away at the contours of class litigation,
whether bolstering certification requirements under Rule 23 or providing
something resembling guidance for FLSA certification. Indeed, we
already know the Court expects to address issues of standing and
mootness in connection with class litigation in the October 2015 term.
What we have seen so far is a Court that understands the economic
significance of high-stakes class litigation and is determined to patrol the
outer boundaries. From a practical standpoint, that means that much
class-action territory is still in play. Wal-Mart v. Dukes did not kill the
class action. And the Court’s general silence to date on FLSA
certification has not removed the decertification weapon from
defendants’ arsenals. If anything, the Court’s attention to class litigation

247. Charles Holland Duell was the former United States Commissioner of Patents who
reportedly said in 1902 that “everything that can be invented has been invented.” See Dennis
Crouch,
Tracing
the
Quote,
PATENTLY-O
(Jan.
6,
2011),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/tracing-the-quote-everything-that-can-be-invented-has-beeninvented.html.
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has shed new light on what can and cannot be achieved either through
class litigation or by agreements designed to forestall it. The legal
system and litigants are better off with that clarity.
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